Related papers: Large Scale Learning of Agent Rationality in Two-P…
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…
By formally defining the training processes of large language models (LLMs), which usually encompasses pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning with human feedback, within a single and unified machine learning…
Recently, there have been several high-profile achievements of agents learning to play games against humans and beat them. In this paper, we study the problem of training intelligent agents in service of game development. Unlike the agents…
Recently, empowered with the powerful capabilities of neural networks, reinforcement learning (RL) has successfully tackled numerous challenging tasks. However, while these models demonstrate enhanced decision-making abilities, they are…
Reward function, as an incentive representation that recognizes humans' agency and rationalizes humans' actions, is particularly appealing for modeling human behavior in human-robot interaction. Inverse Reinforcement Learning is an…
In recent years, reinforcement learning has been successful in solving video games from Atari to Star Craft II. However, the end-to-end model-free reinforcement learning (RL) is not sample efficient and requires a significant amount of…
We study the problem of training a principal in a multi-agent general-sum game using reinforcement learning (RL). Learning a robust principal policy requires anticipating the worst possible strategic responses of other agents, which is…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
Much of recent success in multiagent reinforcement learning has been in two-player zero-sum games. In these games, algorithms such as fictitious self-play and minimax tree search can converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. While…
In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have…
Two player zero sum simultaneous action games are common in video games, financial markets, war, business competition, and many other settings. We first introduce the fundamental concepts of reinforcement learning in two player zero sum…
When creating policies, plans, or designs for people, it is challenging for designers to foresee all of the ways in which people may reason and behave. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be able to simulate human…
Robust Reinforcement Learning (RRL) is a promising Reinforcement Learning (RL) paradigm aimed at training robust to uncertainty or disturbances models, making them more efficient for real-world applications. Following this paradigm,…
As AI technology advances, research in playing text-based games with agents has becomeprogressively popular. In this paper, a novel approach to agent design and agent learning ispresented with the context of reinforcement learning. A model…
Within the context of video games the notion of perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it leads to uninteresting situations, where humans face tough adversarial decision makers. Current frameworks for stochastic games and…
Game theory has long served as a foundational tool in cybersecurity to test, predict, and design strategic interactions between attackers and defenders. The recent advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers new tools and challenges for…
Two traditional paradigms are often used to describe the behavior of agents in multi-agent complex systems. In the first one, agents are considered to be fully rational and systems are seen as multi-player games. In the second one, agents…
While Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in certain reasoning tasks, they struggle in multi-agent games where the final outcome depends on the joint strategies of all agents. In multi-agent games, the non-stationarity of other agents brings…