Related papers: Schelling Games on Graphs
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access to their own data source, combine models from local data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their data from different distributions, though, federated learning…
Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…
We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
This paper studies controlling segregation in social networks via exogenous incentives. We construct an edge formation game on a directed graph. A user (node) chooses the probability with which it forms an inter- or intra- community edge…
Multi-agent learning is a challenging problem in machine learning that has applications in different domains such as distributed control, robotics, and economics. We develop a prescriptive model of multi-agent behavior using Markov games.…
Distributed online optimization and game have been increasingly researched in the last decade, mostly motivated by its wide applications in sensor networks, robotics (e.g., distributed target tracking and formation control), smart grids,…
We define and analyze a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in which decision-making agents can observe the choices and rewards of their neighbors. Neighbors are defined by a network graph with heterogeneous and stochastic…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…
As a schematic model of the complexity economic agents are confronted with, we introduce the ``SK-game'', a discrete time binary choice model inspired from mean-field spin-glasses. We show that even in a completely static environment,…
We consider an agent-based model in which two types of agents interact locally over a graph and have a common intolerance threshold $\tau$ for changing their types with exponentially distributed waiting times. The model is equivalent to an…
Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with…
Most networks are not static objects, but instead they change over time. This observation has sparked rigorous research on temporal graphs within the last years. In temporal graphs, we have a fixed set of nodes and the connections between…
In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group's tendency to stay in unity, which -- as argued in sociometry -- arises from the network topology of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and propose…
This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…