Related papers: Stable Fractional Matchings
Consider the the problem of maximizing the relative social welfare of truthful single-winner voting schemes with cardinal preferences compared to the classical range voting scheme. The range voting scheme is a simple and straightforward…
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and $\boldsymbol{q}$-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of…
Fractional order differential and difference equations are used to model systems with memory. Variable order fractional equations are proposed to model systems where the memory changes in time. We investigate stability conditions for linear…
Fractional derivative and delay are important tools in modeling memory properties in the natural system. This work deals with the stability analysis of a fractional order delay differential equation \begin{equation*} D^\alpha x(t)=\delta…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
We address an inherent difficulty in welfare-theoretic fair machine learning by proposing an equivalently axiomatically-justified alternative and studying the resulting computational and statistical learning questions. Welfare metrics…
This study investigates the use of fractional order differential models to simulate the dynamic response of non-homogeneous discrete systems and to achieve efficient and accurate model order reduction. The traditional integer order approach…
Colloquially, there are two groups, $n$ men and $n$ women, each man (woman) ranking women (men) as potential marriage partners. A complete matching is called stable if no unmatched pair prefer each other to their partners in the matching.…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
This is a preliminary study for bifurcation in fractional order dynamical systems. Stability, persistence and hopf bifurcation are studied. Some studies are also done for functional equations.
We study the consistency and consistency strength of various configurations concerning the cardinal characteristics $\mathfrak{s}_\theta,\mathfrak{p}_\theta,\mathfrak{g}_\theta,\mathfrak{r}_\theta,\mathfrak{t}_\theta$ at uncountable regular…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
In this paper we consider the problem of finding stable maxima of expensive (to evaluate) functions. We are motivated by the optimisation of physical and industrial processes where, for some input ranges, small and unavoidable variations in…
When the target of statistical inference is chosen in a data-driven manner, the guarantees provided by classical theories vanish. We propose a solution to the problem of inference after selection by building on the framework of algorithmic…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number…