Related papers: Stable Fractional Matchings
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
In this paper, we begin by discussing different types of preference profiles related to the stable marriage problem. We then introduce the concept of soulmates, which are a man and a woman who rank each other first. Inversely, we examine…
In this paper, some global existence and uniform asymptotic stability results for fractional functional differential equations are proved. It is worthy mentioning that when $\alpha=1$ the initial value problem (1.1) reduces to a classical…
This paper is devoted to studying the asymptotic behaviour of solutions to generalized non-commensurate fractional systems. To this end, we first consider fractional systems with rational orders and introduce a criterion that is necessary…
In this paper, we consider the approximate weighted graph matching problem and introduce stable and informative first and second order compatibility terms suitable for inclusion into the popular integer quadratic program formulation. Our…
The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences,…
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
This paper investigates a category of constrained fractional optimization problems that emerge in various practical applications. The objective function for this category is characterized by the ratio of a numerator and denominator, both…
A stable filter has the property that it asymptotically `forgets' initial perturbations. As a result of this property, it is possible to construct approximations of such filters whose errors remain small in time, in other words…
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances…
Optimization under uncertainty and risk is indispensable in many practical situations. Our paper addresses stability of optimization problems using composite risk functionals which are subjected to measure perturbations. Our main focus is…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
We present a simple randomized reduction from fully-dynamic integral matching algorithms to fully-dynamic "approximately-maximal" fractional matching algorithms. Applying this reduction to the recent fractional matching algorithm of…