Related papers: Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic…
This paper deals with belief base revision that is a form of belief change consisting of the incorporation of new facts into an agent's beliefs represented by a finite set of propositional formulas. In the aim to guarantee more reliability…
Traditionally, an agent's beliefs would come from what the agent can see, hear, or sense. In the modern world, beliefs are often based on the data available to the agents. In this work, we investigate a dynamic logic of such beliefs that…
There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a priority between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts. One formalism that has been widely employed for non-monotonic reasoning is the sceptical one known as…
This paper introduces epistemic graphs as a generalization of the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation. In these graphs, an argument can be believed or disbelieved up to a given degree, thus providing a more fine--grained…
The field of iterated belief change has focused mainly on revision, with the other main operator of AGM belief change theory, i.e. contraction, receiving relatively little attention. In this paper we extend the Harper Identity from…
Standard epistemic logic is concerned with describing agents' epistemic attitudes given the current set of alternatives the agents consider possible. While distributed systems can (and often are) discussed without mentioning epistemics, it…
Logic programs under the stable model semantics, or answer-set programs, provide an expressive rule-based knowledge representation framework, featuring a formal, declarative and well-understood semantics. However, handling the evolution of…
Belief revision and update, two significant types of belief change, both focus on how an agent modify her beliefs in presence of new information. The most striking difference between them is that the former studies the change of beliefs in…
The AGM model is the most remarkable framework for modeling belief revision. However, it is not perfect in all aspects. Paraconsistent belief revision, multi-agent belief revision and non-prioritized belief revision are three different…
We consider credibility-limited revision in the framework of belief change for epistemic spaces, permitting inconsistent belief sets and inconsistent beliefs. In this unrestricted setting, the class of credibility-limited revision operators…
As ontologies and description logics (DLs) reach out to a broader audience, several reasoning services are developed in this context. Belief revision is one of them, of prime importance when knowledge is prone to change and inconsistency.…
We propose a method for an agent to revise its incomplete probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information is observed. In this work, an agent's beliefs are represented by a set of probabilistic formulae -- a belief base.…
The stability rule for belief, advocated by Leitgeb [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164, 2013], is a rule for rational acceptance that captures categorical belief in terms of $\textit{probabilistically stable propositions}$: propositions…
Belief revision of knowledge bases represented by a set of sentences in a given logic has been extensively studied but for specific logics, mainly propositional, and also recently Horn and description logics. Here, we propose to generalize…
Iterated Belief Change is the research area that investigates principles for the dynamics of beliefs over (possibly unlimited) many subsequent belief changes. In this paper, we demonstrate how iterated belief change is connected to…
Darwiche and Pearl's seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most of the suggestions…
Forgetting as a knowledge management operation deliberately ignores parts of the knowledge and beliefs of an agent, for various reasons. Forgetting has many facets, one may want to forget parts of the syntax, a proposition, or a…
The AGM postulates by Alchourr\'{o}n, G\"{a}rdenfors, and Makinson continue to represent a cornerstone in research related to belief change. We generalize the approach of Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) for characterizing AGM base revision from…
Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some…
We propose a new paradigm for Belief Change in which the new information is represented as sets of models, while the agent's body of knowledge is represented as a finite set of formulae, that is, a finite base. The focus on finiteness is…