Related papers: Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic…
AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated…
AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. Recently, several logics for belief and information change have been proposed in the literature and used to encode belief change operations in rich…
Traditional logic-based belief revision research focuses on designing rules to constrain the behavior of revision operators. Frameworks have been proposed to characterize iterated revision rules, but they are often too loose, leading to…
We look at preference change arising out of an interaction between two elements: the first is an initial preference ranking encoding a pre-existing attitude; the second element is new preference information signaling input from an…
We investigate the belief revision problem in epistemic planning, i.e., what will be the beliefs of all agents in a multi-agent system after an agent gains the belief in some state property. Based on the standard representation in epistemic…
In this work, we investigate the use of Dynamic Preference Logic to encode BDI mental attitudes. Further, exploring this codification and the representation of preferences over possible worlds by preferences over propositional formulas,…
We introduce a logic for temporal beliefs and intentions based on Shoham's database perspective. We separate strong beliefs from weak beliefs. Strong beliefs are independent from intentions, while weak beliefs are obtained by adding…
In action domains where agents may have erroneous beliefs, reasoning about the effects of actions involves reasoning about belief change. In this paper, we use a transition system approach to reason about the evolution of an agents beliefs…
The research on non-prioritized revision studies revision operators which do not accept all new beliefs. In this paper, we contribute to this line of research by introducing the concept of dynamic-limited revision, which are revisions…
In an earlier paper [Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a correspondence was established between the choice structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief…
Recent methods have adapted the well-established AGM and belief base frameworks for belief change to cover belief revision in logic programs. In this study here, we present two new sets of belief change operators for logic programs. They…
Belief revision has been studied mainly with respect to background logics that are monotonic in character. In this paper we study belief revision when the underlying logic is non-monotonic instead--an inherently interesting problem that is…
The AGM theory of belief revision has become an important paradigm for investigating rational belief changes. Unfortunately, researchers working in this paradigm have restricted much of their attention to rather simple representations of…
We establish a generic, model-theoretic characterization of belief revision operators implementing the paradigm of minimal change according to the seminal work by Alchourr\'{o}n, G\"{a}rdenfors, and Makinson (AGM). Our characterization…
A belief base revision is developed. The belief base is represented using Unified Answer Set Programs which is capable of representing imprecise and uncertain information and perform nonomonotonic reasoning with them. The base revision…
The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and…
This paper deals with the revision of partially ordered beliefs. It proposes a semantic representation of epistemic states by partial pre-orders on interpretations and a syntactic representation by partially ordered belief bases. Two…
We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about…
We address a general representation problem for belief change, and describe two interrelated representations for iterative non-prioritized change: a logical representation in terms of persistent epistemic states, and a constructive…
In most classical models of belief change, epistemic states are represented by theories (AGM) or formulas (Katsuno-Mendelzon) and the new pieces of information by formulas. The Representation Theorem for revision operators says that…