Related papers: Attaining Fairness in Communication for Omniscienc…
We study common randomness generation problems where $n$ players aim to generate same sequences of random coin flips where some subsets of the players share an independent common coin which can be tossed multiple times, and there is a…
The Shapley value is the solution concept in cooperative game theory that is most used in both theoretical as practical settings. Unfortunately, computing the Shapley value is computationally intractable in general. This paper focuses on…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
The problem of allocating indivisible resources to agents arises in a wide range of domains, including treatment distribution and social support programs. An important goal in algorithm design for this problem is fairness, where the focus…
In many applications, an organization may want to acquire data from many data owners. Data marketplaces allow data owners to produce data assemblage needed by data buyers through coalition. To encourage coalitions to produce data, it is…
We study minimum entropy submodular optimization, a common generalization of the minimum entropy set cover problem, studied earlier by Cardinal et al., and the submodular set cover problem. We give a general bound of the approximation…
We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…
We introduce the novel notion of winning cores in parity games and develop a deterministic polynomial-time under-approximation algorithm for solving parity games based on winning core approximation. Underlying this algorithm are a number…
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…
Ensuring fairness in computational problems has emerged as a $key$ topic during recent years, buoyed by considerations for equitable resource distributions and social justice. It $is$ possible to incorporate fairness in computational…
Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…
We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…
Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental…
The \emph{rational fair consensus problem} can be informally defined as follows. Consider a network of $n$ (selfish) \emph{rational agents}, each of them initially supporting a \emph{color} chosen from a finite set $ \Sigma$. The goal is to…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
The system that we study in this paper contains a set of users that observe a discrete memoryless multiple source and communicate via noise-free channels with the aim of attaining omniscience, the state that all users recover the entire…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…
A collection of objects, some of which are good and some are bad, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely…
We introduce a game-theoretic approach to the study of recommendation systems with strategic content providers. Such systems should be fair and stable. Showing that traditional approaches fail to satisfy these requirements, we propose the…