Related papers: Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division …
We study the fair division of indivisible items with subsidies among $n$ agents, where the absolute marginal valuation of each item is at most one. Under monotone valuations (where each item is a good), Brustle et al. (2020) demonstrated…
We study the problem of determining an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among multiple agents with additive valuations. EFX, which stands for envy-freeness up to any good, is a well-studied relaxation of the envy-free allocation…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to…
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open…
We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy queries. In the two-agent setting with Gaussian noise and bounded…
We consider the complexity of finding envy-free allocations for the class of graphical valuations. Graphical valuations were introduced by Christodoulou et. al.(2023) as a structured class of valuations that admit allocations that are…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several bounds on the optimal…
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
Recommender systems are facing scrutiny because of their growing impact on the opportunities we have access to. Current audits for fairness are limited to coarse-grained parity assessments at the level of sensitive groups. We propose to…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
The two standard fairness notions in the resource allocation literature are proportionality and envy-freeness. If there are n agents competing for the available resources, then proportionality requires that each agent receives at least a…
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One…
We study a fair division problem in (multi)graphs where $n$ agents (vertices) are pairwise connected by items (edges), and each agent is only interested in its incident items. We consider how to allocate items to incident agents in an…
The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences,…
We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. EFX is a compelling fairness notion, and whether such allocations always…
We consider prior-free auctions for revenue and welfare maximization when agents have a common budget. The abstract environments we consider are ones where there is a downward-closed and symmetric feasibility constraint on the probabilities…