Related papers: Committee Selection with Attribute Level Preferenc…
In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select $k$-member committees based on voters' approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the justified representation (JR) axiom, which demands that no large…
In many real world problems, features do not act alone but in combination with each other. For example, in genomics, diseases might not be caused by any single mutation but require the presence of multiple mutations. Prior work on feature…
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under conventional voting or can delegate its votes to the other group…
We propose a novel and efficient algorithm for the collaborative preference completion problem, which involves jointly estimating individualized rankings for a set of entities over a shared set of items, based on a limited number of…
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…
In many institutional settings, $k$ items are selected with the goal of representing the underlying distribution of claims, opinions, or characteristics in a large population. We study environments with two adversarial parties whose…
In this letter we summarize some recent theoretical work on the design of collectives, i.e., of systems containing many agents, each of which can be viewed as trying to maximize an associated private utility, where there is also a world…
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step…
Feature selection is popular for obtaining small, interpretable, yet highly accurate prediction models. Conventional feature-selection methods typically yield one feature set only, which might not suffice in some scenarios. For example,…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…
Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms…
In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding…
The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual…
Preference aggregation is a core operation in multi-objective design optimisation and group decision-making, as it determines the best-fit-for-common-purpose alternative within complex socio-technical contexts. Therefore, their aggregation…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true…