Related papers: Committee Selection with Attribute Level Preferenc…
We consider the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined set. Each item is described by a vector of attributes and for each attribute there is a desired distribution that the selected set should…
In many real-world applications of committee elections, the candidates are associated with certain attributes and the chosen committee is required to satisfy some constraints posed on the candidate attributes. For instance, when dress…
We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved, disapproved,…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting…
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting,…
We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We…
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…
We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician's…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are selected. Aziz et al. (2015) proposed two representation axioms called justified…
We study diversity in approval-based committee elections with incomplete or inaccurate information. We define diversity according to the Maximum Coverage problem, which is known to be $\mathsf{NP}$-complete, with a best attainable…
Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of objects with desired properties, e.g., a shortlist of candidates for an interview, a representative collective body such…
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of…
Combinatorial preference aggregation has many applications in AI. Given the exponential nature of these preferences, compact representations are needed and ($m$)CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential and global voting are two…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are to be selected. In particular we focus on the axiomatic property called extended…
In this paper we address the problem of electing a committee among a set of $m$ candidates and on the basis of the preferences of a set of $n$ voters. We consider the approval voting method in which each voter can approve as many candidates…