Related papers: Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms…
Evolutionary competition often occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of organization, in which traits or behaviors that are costly for an individual can provide collective benefits to groups to which the individual belongs. Building off…
We present the explicit construction of a stable queue with several servers and impatient customers, under stationary ergodic assumptions. Using a stochastic comparison of the (multivariate) workload sequence with two monotonic stochastic…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker can be employed at only one firm. While firm utilities over…
The paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of different join-the-shortest-queue models including load-balanced networks with general input and output processes. It is shown, that the necessary and sufficient…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that appear in imprecise-probabilistic decision…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into two non over-lapping sets, set of workers and set of firms. We consider…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
We prove a structure theorem for stable functions on amenable groups, which extends the arithmetic regularity lemma for stable subsets of finite groups. Given a group $G$, a function $f\colon G\to [-1,1]$ is called stable if the binary…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
The concept of sequential choice functions is introduced and studied. This concept applies to the reduction of the problem of stable matchings with sequential workers to a situation where the workers are linear.
We consider a single-server cyclic polling system with three queues where the server follows an adaptive rule: if it finds one of queues empty in a given cycle, it decides not to visit that queue in the next cycle. In the case of limited…
Propositional formulas that are equivalent in intuitionistic logic, or in its extension known as the logic of here-and-there, have the same stable models. We extend this theorem to propositional formulas with infinitely long conjunctions…
The stability rule for belief, advocated by Leitgeb [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164, 2013], is a rule for rational acceptance that captures categorical belief in terms of $\textit{probabilistically stable propositions}$: propositions…
We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…