Related papers: Zero-sum Stochastic Games: Limit Optimal Trajector…
In this article, we study a discounted stochastic game to model resource optimal intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. To address the problem of uncertainties in various network parameters, we propose a globalized robust game…
We establish existence of Markov chains of mean-field type with unbounded jump intensities by means of a fixed point argument using the Total Variation distance. We further show existence of nearly-optimal controls and, using a Markov chain…
We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum games played on graphs and makes contributions toward the following question: given an objective, how much memory is required to play optimally for that objective? We study regular objectives, where…
We propose an analytically tractable variation of the minority game in which rational agents use probabilistic strategies. In our model, $N$ agents choose between two alternatives repeatedly, and those who are in the minority get a pay-off…
We study stochastic zero-sum games on graphs, which are prevalent tools to model decision-making in presence of an antagonistic opponent in a random environment. In this setting, an important question is the one of strategy complexity: what…
For a zero-sum stochastic game which does not satisfy the Isaacs condition, we provide a value function representation for an Isaacs-type equation whose Hamiltonian lies in between the lower and upper Hamiltonians, as a convex combination…
On a filtered probability space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},P,\mathbb{F}=(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t=0,\dotso,T})$, we consider stopper-stopper games $\overline V:=\inf_{\Rho\in\bT^{ii}}\sup_{\tau\in\T}\E[U(\Rho(\tau),\tau)]$ and $\underline…
This paper presents an axiomatic approach to finite Markov decision processes where the discount rate is zero. One of the principal difficulties in the no discounting case is that, even if attention is restricted to stationary policies, a…
We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into…
We study nonzero-sum stochastic switching games. Two players compete for market dominance through controlling (via timing options) the discrete-state market regime $M$. Switching decisions are driven by a continuous stochastic factor $X$…
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…
Discounting the influence of future events is a key paradigm in economics and it is widely used in computer-science models, such as games, Markov decision processes (MDPs), reinforcement learning, and automata. While a single game or MDP…
We develop an approach for two player constraint zero-sum and nonzero-sum stochastic differential games, which are modeled by Markov regime-switching jump-diffusion processes. We provide the relations between a usual stochastic optimal…
A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…
A classical problem in ergodic continuous time control consists of studying the limit behavior of the optimal value of a discounted cost functional with infinite horizon as the discount factor $\lambda$ tends to zero. In the literature,…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un- der the assumption that optimal worst-case…