Related papers: Fair Multi-Cake Cutting
We study the recently introduced cake-cutting setting in which the cake is represented by an undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling the division of road networks. We show that when the graph…
We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer…
We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic…
Envy-free cake-cutting protocols procedurally divide an infinitely divisible good among a set of agents so that no agent prefers another's allocation to their own. These protocols are highly complex and difficult to prove correct. Recently,…
We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultaneously by all…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework…
Given a set of n sticks of various (not necessarily different) lengths, what is the largest length so that we can cut k equally long pieces of this length from the given set of sticks? We analyze the structure of this problem and show that…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…
Fair division with unequal shares is an intensively studied recourse allocation problem. For $ i\in [n] $, let $ \mu_i $ be an atomless probability measure on the measurable space $(C,\mathcal{S}) $ and let $ t_i $ be positive numbers…
The fair division literature in economics considers how to divide resources between multiple agents such that the allocation is envy-free: each agent receives their favorite piece. Researchers have developed a variety of fair division…
In this article we study a cake cutting problem. More precisely, we study symmetric fair division algorithms, that is to say we study algorithms where the order of the players do not influence the value obtained by each player. In the first…
We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…
This paper extends the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical example of such a cake is land. We…
We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
Cake-cutting is a playful name for the fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good among agents, a well-studied problem at the intersection of mathematics, economics, and artificial intelligence. The cake-cutting literature is rich and…
A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the…
There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, a land-estate with some parts heavily taxed, or a chore with some parts fun to do. The resource has to be divided…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…