Related papers: Optimal Prizes for All-Pay Contests in Heterogeneo…
This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…
Modern decision making tools are based on statistical analysis of abundant data, which is often collected by querying multiple individuals. We consider data collection through crowdsourcing, where independent and self-interested agents,…
Incentive mechanism design has aroused extensive attention for crowdsourcing applications in recent years. Most research assumes that participants are already in the system and aware of the existence of crowdsourcing tasks. Whereas in real…
Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mechanisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
We consider the situation where multiple transportation service providers cooperate to offer an integrated multi-modal platform to enhance the convenience to the passengers through ease in multi-modal journey planning, payment, and first…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
In crowdsourcing, a group of common people is asked to execute the tasks and in return will receive some incentives. In this article, one of the crowdsourcing scenarios with multiple heterogeneous tasks and multiple IoT devices (as task…
In the contest design problem, there are $n$ strategic contestants, each of whom decides an effort level. A contest designer with a fixed budget must then design a mechanism that allocates a prize $p_i$ to the $i$-th rank based on the…
In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies for spectrum auction, route selection and relaying incentives should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource bidding and…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
Crowdsourced wireless community network enables individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
This paper examines the problem of distributing rewards on social networks to improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing tasks for sponsors. To complete the tasks efficiently, we aim to design reward mechanisms that incentivize early-joining…
Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truthful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in…
Crowdsourcing is now widely used to replace judgement by an expert authority with an aggregate evaluation from a number of non-experts, in applications ranging from rating and categorizing online content to evaluation of student assignments…
A common use of crowd sourcing is to obtain labels for a dataset. Several algorithms have been proposed to identify uninformative members of the crowd so that their labels can be disregarded and the cost of paying them avoided. One common…
Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort. I characterise the unique symmetric MPE with the quality of…
This paper investigates a two-stage game-theoretical model with multiple parallel rank-order contests. In this model, each contest designer sets up a contest and determines the prize structure within a fixed budget in the first stage.…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…