Related papers: Strategically Simple Mechanisms
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
The idea is advanced that self-organization in complex systems can be treated as decision making (as it is performed by humans) and, vice versa, decision making is nothing but a kind of self-organization in the decision maker nervous…
In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in…
Important decisions are likely made by groups of agents. Thus group decision making is very common in practice. Very transparent group aggregating rules are given by weighted voting, where each agent is assigned a weight. Here a proposal is…
When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that…
In many combinatorial games, one can prove that the first player wins under best play using a simple but non-constructive argument called strategy-stealing. This work is about the complexity behind these proofs: how hard is it to actually…
A broad current application of algorithms is in formal and quantitative measures of murky concepts -- like merit -- to make decisions. When people strategically respond to these sorts of evaluations in order to gain favorable decision…
In many real-world situations, there is often not enough information to know that a certain strategy will succeed in achieving the goal, but there is a good reason to believe that it will. The paper introduces the term ``doxastic'' for such…
In this chapter the complex systems are discussed in the context of economic and business policy and decision making. It will be showed and motivated that social systems are typically chaotic, non-linear and/or non-equilibrium and therefore…
Stochastic processes offer a flexible mathematical formalism to model and reason about systems. Most analysis tools, however, start from the premises that models are fully specified, so that any parameters controlling the system's dynamics…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
We study a social choice setting of manipulation in elections and extend the usual model in two major ways: first, instead of considering a single manipulating agent, in our setting there are several, possibly competing ones; second,…
In many settings -- like market research and social choice -- people may be presented with unfamiliar options. Classical mechanisms may perform poorly because they fail to incentivize people to learn about these options, or worse, encourage…
While autonomous agents often surpass humans in their ability to handle vast and complex data, their potential misalignment (i.e., lack of transparency regarding their true objective) has thus far hindered their use in critical applications…
We consider multi-agent argumentation, where each agent's view of the arguments is encoded as an argumentation framework (AF). Then we study deliberative processes than can occur on this basis. We think of a deliberative process as taking…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…