Related papers: Core-Selecting Mechanisms in Electricity Markets
Electricity market operators worldwide use mixed-integer linear programming to solve the allocation problem in wholesale electricity markets. Prices are typically determined based on the duals of relaxed versions of this optimization…
We consider the problem of online dynamic mechanism design for sequential auctions in unknown environments, where the underlying market and, thus, the bidders' values vary over time as interactions between the seller and the bidders…
Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems are attracting a large amount of interest from researchers with the development of the smart grid technologies. A smart grid aims at effective control and conditioning of the…
In electricity markets, locational marginal price (LMP) forecasting is particularly important for market participants in making reasonable bidding strategies, managing potential trading risks, and supporting efficient system planning and…
The sorting and filtering capabilities offered by modern e-commerce platforms significantly impact customers' purchase decisions, as well as the resulting prices set by competing sellers on these platforms. Motivated by this practical…
This paper develops a recent line of economic theory seeking to understand public goods economies using methods of topological analysis. Our first main result is a very clean characterization of the economy's core (the standard solution…
We study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to charging stations and scheduling their charging. We develop offline and online solutions that treat EV users as self-interested agents that aim to maximise their profit and…
To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the…
We set up a supply-side game-theoretic model for the cooperative production of virtual products. In our model, a group of producers collaboratively produce a virtual product by contributing costly input resources to a production coalition.…
The coordinated operation of interconnected but locally controlled electricity markets is generally referred to as a "coupling". In this paper we propose a new mechanism design for efficient coupling of independent electricity markets. The…
This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows…
This paper develops a machine learning-driven portfolio optimization framework for virtual bidding in electricity markets considering both risk constraint and price sensitivity. The algorithmic trading strategy is developed from the…
We introduce the "local-global" approach for a divisible portfolio and perform an equilibrium analysis for two variants of core-selecting auctions. Our main novelty is extending the Nearest-VCG pricing rule in a dynamic two-round setup,…
Electric vehicle charging and geo-distributed datacenters introduce spatially flexible loads (FLs) that couple power, transportation, and datacenter networks. These couplings create a closed-loop feedback between locational marginal prices…
We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized Second…
In industrial scenarios involving multi-agent collective decision-making, centralized decision-making may not be admissible due to restrictive access to individual local information, while the conflicts between participants' self-interest…
Since the 1990s, widespread introduction of central (wholesale) electricity markets has been seen across multiple continents, driven by the search for efficient operation of the power grid through competition. The increase of renewables has…
We propose a new forward electricity market framework that admits heterogeneous market participants with second-order cone strategy sets, who accurately express the nonlinearities in their costs and constraints through conic bids, and a…
The implementation of electricity markets based on locational marginal pricing in a multi-settlement process has allowed wholesale competition, with pricing mechanisms that incentivize the optimal allocation of generation, transmission, and…
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…