Related papers: Core-Selecting Mechanisms in Electricity Markets
The potential of recovering the topology of a grid using solely publicly available market data is explored here. In contemporary whole-sale electricity markets, real-time prices are typically determined by solving the network-constrained…
It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniform-price Pan-European day-ahead electricity market "PCR" (Price…
Adopting a zonal structure of electricity market requires specification of zones' borders. In this paper we use social welfare as the measure to assess quality of various zonal divisions. The social welfare is calculated by Market Coupling…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
An effective distribution electricity market (DEM) is required to manage the rapidly growing small-scale distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution systems (DSs). This paper proposes a day-ahead DEM clearing and pricing mechanism…
Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a widely employed method for pricing electricity in the wholesale electricity market. Although it is well known that the LMP mechanism is vulnerable to market manipulation, there is little literature…
As electricity consumption grows, reducing peak demand--the maximum load on the grid--has become critical for preventing infrastructure strain and blackouts. Pricing mechanisms that incentivize consumers with flexible loads to shift…
An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game…
This paper investigates large fluctuations of Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) in wholesale energy markets caused by volatile renewable generation profiles. Specifically, we study events of the form $\mathbb{P} \Big ( \mathbf{LMP} \notin…
The start up costs in many kinds of generators lead to complex cost structures, which in turn yield severe market loopholes in the locational marginal price (LMP) scheme. Convex hull pricing (a.k.a. extended LMP) is proposed to improve the…
This paper introduces a model for coordinating prosumers with heterogeneous distributed energy resources (DERs), participating in the local energy market (LEM) that interacts with the market-clearing entity. The proposed LEM scheme utilizes…
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
Modern market management systems continue to evolve due to the intentions to improve system security and reliability. This evolvement has been leading to a transition of market auction models from a deterministic structure with…
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions (CAs) restrict the auction result in the core such that no coalitions could improve their utilities by engaging in collusion. The minimum-revenue-core (MRC) rule is a widely used core-selecting payment…
Currently, most ISOs adopt offer cost minimization (OCM) auction mechanism which minimizes the total offer cost, and then, a settlement rule based on either locational marginal prices (LMPs) or market clearing price (MCP) is used to…
Existing auction mechanisms are vulnerable to bidder collusion, which substantially degrades revenue and non-colluder welfare. To design truthful mechanisms resilient to collusion, we introduce a novel approach that leverages a machine…
Market power behaviour often occurs in modern wholesale electricity markets. Mixed Complementarity Problems (MCPs) have been typically used for computational modelling of market power when it is characterised by an oligopoly with…
The presence of integer variables in the European day-ahead electricity market renders the social welfare maximization problem non-convex and non-differentiable, making classical marginal pricing theoretically inconsistent. Existing pricing…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…