Related papers: Learning Quadratic Games on Networks

In social dilemmas, most interactions are transient and susceptible to restructuring, leading to continuous changes in social networks over time. Typically, agents assess the rewards of their current interactions and adjust their…

We study financial systems from a game-theoretic standpoint. A financial system is represented by a network, where nodes correspond to firms, and directed labeled edges correspond to debt contracts between them. The existence of cycles in…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

We study how strategic interaction can arise from controlled quantum dynamics rather than being imposed as an external mathematical structure. We introduce a class of interaction-defined quantum games in which players are represented by…

A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is presented for networked games. We assume an incomplete information available to each player about the other players' actions. The players communicate over a strongly connected digraph to…

We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a…

In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…

In stochastic Nash equilibrium problems (SNEPs), it is natural for players to be uncertain about their complex environments and have multi-dimensional unknown parameters in their models. Among various SNEPs, this paper focuses on locally…

We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural…

We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…

A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…

At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…