Related papers: Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant S…
We consider the assignment problem, where $n$ agents have to be matched to $n$ items. Each agent has a preference order over the items. In the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism the agents act in a particular order and pick their most…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons…
Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently,…
{\em Distortion} is a well-established notion for quantifying the loss of social welfare that may occur in voting. As voting rules take as input only ordinal information, they are essentially forced to neglect the exact values the agents…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
This paper establishes non-asymptotic convergence of the cutoffs in Random serial dictatorship in an environment with many students, many schools, and arbitrary student preferences. Convergence is shown to hold when the number of schools,…
Motivated by recent work in computational social choice, we extend the metric distortion framework to clustering problems. Given a set of $n$ agents located in an underlying metric space, our goal is to partition them into $k$ clusters,…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
We consider models for social choice where voters rank a set of choices (or alternatives) by deliberating in small groups of size at most $k$, and these outcomes are aggregated by a social choice rule to find the winning alternative. We…
For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). These two…
In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal…
We develop new voting mechanisms for the case when voters and candidates are located in an arbitrary unknown metric space, and the goal is to choose a candidate minimizing social cost: the total distance from the voters to this candidate.…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
In the single winner determination problem, we have n voters and m candidates and each voter j incurs a cost c(i, j) if candidate i is chosen. Our objective is to choose a candidate that minimizes the expected total cost incurred by the…
Suppose that we have $n$ agents and $n$ items which lie in a shared metric space. We would like to match the agents to items such that the total distance from agents to their matched items is as small as possible. However, instead of having…
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to…
Sortition is the practice of delegating public decision-making to randomly selected panels. Recently, it has gained momentum worldwide through its use in citizens' assemblies, sparking growing interest within the computer science community.…
Distortion-based analysis has established itself as a fruitful framework for comparing voting mechanisms. m voters and n candidates are jointly embedded in an (unknown) metric space, and the voters submit rankings of candidates by…