Related papers: On convexity and solution concepts in cooperative …
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
The main goal of this paper is to settle a conceptual framework for cooperative game theory in which the notion of composition/aggregation of games is the defining structure. This is done via the mathematical theory of algebraic operads: we…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
The purpose of this study is to propose a model that predicts the social and psychological factors that affect the individuals collaborative learning outcome in group projects. The model is established on the basis of two theories, namely,…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…
I introduce cooperative product games (CPGs), a cooperative game where every player has a weight, and the value of a coalition is the product of the weights of the players in the coalition. I only look at games where the weights are at…
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…
Researchers in explainable artificial intelligence have developed numerous methods for helping users understand the predictions of complex supervised learning models. By contrast, explaining the $\textit{uncertainty}$ of model outputs has…
Game-theoretic formulations of feature importance have become popular as a way to "explain" machine learning models. These methods define a cooperative game between the features of a model and distribute influence among these input elements…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
The Reward-Penalty-Selection Problem (RPSP) can be seen as a combination of the Set Cover Problem (SCP) and the Hitting Set Problem (HSP). Given a set of elements, a set of reward sets, and a set of penalty sets, one tries to find a subset…
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…
We study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities in the introduced family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games. A non-cooperative game embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism, and…
The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…
Various peer-to-peer energy markets have emerged in recent years in an attempt to manage distributed energy resources in a more efficient way. One of the main challenges these models face is how to create and allocate incentives to…