Related papers: False Analog Data Injection Attack Towards Topolog…

In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…

False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against powersystem state estimation are a growing concern for operators.Previously, most works on FDI attacks have been performedunder the assumption of the attacker having full knowledge ofthe underlying…

State estimation is a data processing algorithm for converting redundant meter measurements and other information into an estimate of the state of a power system. Relying heavily on meter measurements, state estimation has proven to be…

Data attacks on state estimation modify part of system measurements such that the tempered measurements cause incorrect system state estimates. Attack techniques proposed in the literature often require detailed knowledge of system…

The advent of smart power grid which plays a vital role in the upcoming smart city era is accompanied with the implementation of a monitoring tool, called state estimation. For the case of the unbalanced residential distribution grid, the…

State estimation is of considerable significance for the power system operation and control. However, well-designed false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate…

Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain the power system operating in a secure and efficient state. The recently identified coordinated data injection attacks to meter measurements can bypass the current security…

This work studies the modeling of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs). First, we introduce a static state estimation model and bad data detection method for IEGSs. Then, we develop FDIAs on…

Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…

A class of data integrity attack, known as false data injection (FDI) attack, has been studied with a considerable amount of work. It has shown that with perfect knowledge of the system model and the capability to manipulate a certain…

The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…

In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…

We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…

A novel false data injection attack (FDIA) model against DC state estimation is proposed, which requires no network parameters and exploits only limited phasor measurement unit (PMU) data. The proposed FDIA model can target specific states…

We study the security threats of power system operation brought by a class of data injection attacks upon load forecasting algorithms. In particular, with minimal assumptions on the knowledge and ability of the attacker, we design attack…

Modern advances in sensor, computing, and communication technologies enable various smart grid applications. The heavy dependence on communication technology has highlighted the vulnerability of the electricity grid to false data injection…

The security of energy supply in a power grid critically depends on the ability to accurately estimate the state of the system. However, manipulated power flow measurements can potentially hide overloads and bypass the bad data detection…

This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…

Power systems become more prone to cyber-attacks due to the high integration of information technologies. In this paper, we demonstrate that the outages of some lines can be masked by injecting false data into a set of measurements. The…

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement…