Related papers: Uncertainty and Robustness of Surplus Extraction
We examine the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with behavioral types. In our model behavioral types always perfectly reveal their private information. We characterize the sufficient conditions that guarantee full…
We study surplus extraction in the general environment of McAfee and Reny (1992), and provide two alternative proofs of their main theorem. The first is an analogue of the classic argument of Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988), using geometric…
Cr\'emer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. We study whether this phenomenon persists when…
We present an standard constraints generation algorithm to find an explicit set whose robustness is equal to the robustness of the feasible solution set of a combinatorial optimization problem with cost uncertainty. Computational experience…
Informally, an extractor delivers perfect randomness from a source that may be far away from the uniform distribution, yet contains some randomness. This task is a crucial ingredient of any attempt to produce perfectly random…
In this paper, we develop a unified framework for studying constrained robust optimal control problems with adjustable uncertainty sets. In contrast to standard constrained robust optimal control problems with known uncertainty sets, we…
Classic results show that even an arbitrarily small correlation across bidders' information can enable full surplus extraction in auctions and related mechanism design settings. Motivated by this fragility, we study the information…
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences,…
We define and study the independent natural extension of two local uncertainty models for the general case of infinite spaces, using the frameworks of sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions. In contrast to Miranda and…
How to generate provably true randomness with minimal assumptions? This question is important not only for the efficiency and the security of information processing, but also for understanding how extremely unpredictable events are possible…
This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design…
We study procurement design when the buyer is uncertain about both the value of the good and the seller's cost. The buyer has a conjectured model but does not fully trust it. She first identifies mechanisms that maximize her worst-case…
Hidden variable graphical models can sometimes imply constraints on the observable distribution that are more complex than simple conditional independence relations. These observable constraints can falsify assumptions of the model that…
Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second inference does…
We extend Berge's Maximum Theorem to allow for incomplete preferences. We first provide a simple version of the Maximum Theorem for convex feasible sets and a fixed preference. Then, we show that if, in addition to the traditional…
The adaptation to situations of sequential choice under uncertainty of decision criteria which deviate from (subjective) expected utility raises the problem of ensuring the selection of a nondominated strategy. In particular, when following…
We propose and axiomatize preferences on a product state space in light of uncertainty regarding the dependency of different payoff-relevant factors. Dependence structures allow to decompose probabilities and allow to pin down behavior…
Crawford's et al. (2021) article on estimation of discrete choice models with unobserved or latent consideration sets, presents a unified framework to address the problem in practice by using "sufficient sets", defined as a combination of…
We introduce the notion of rigidity in auction design and use it to analyze some fundamental aspects of mechanism design. We focus on single-item auctions where the values of the bidders are drawn from some (possibly correlated)…
We contemplate an experimental situation in a $2^k$-factorial experiment with acute resource crunch so that we need to conduct just a saturated design [SD] - with the understanding that precision of the estimates cannot be estimated from…