Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling
Abstract
Cr\'emer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. We study whether this phenomenon persists when the auctioneer has only incomplete knowledge of the distribution, represented by a finite family of candidate distributions, and has sample access to the real distribution. We show that the naive approach which uses samples to distinguish candidate distributions may fail, whereas an extended version of the Cr\'emer-McLean auction simultaneously extracts full social surplus under each candidate distribution. With an algebraic argument, we give a tight bound on the number of samples needed by this auction, which is the difference between the number of candidate distributions and the dimension of the linear space they span.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1406.1571,
title = {Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling},
author = {Hu Fu and Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline and Robert Kleinberg},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1571},
year = {2014}
}