Related papers: Intermediated Implementation
We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…
We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…
Human behaviors are regularized by a variety of norms or regulations, either to maintain orders or to enhance social welfare. If artificially intelligent (AI) agents make decisions on behalf of human beings, we would hope they can also…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
What should regulators of complex algorithms regulate? We propose a model of oversight over 'black-box' algorithms used in high-stakes applications such as lending, medical testing, or hiring. In our model, a regulator is limited in how…
We study whether a planner can robustly implement a state-contingent social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state and (ii) the planner faces uncertainty regarding agents' preferences over outcomes, information…
A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across two components: a…
Recent trends in Agent Computational Economics research, envelop a government agent in the model of the economy, whose decisions are based on learning algorithms. In this paper we try to evaluate the performance of simulated annealing in…
Dynamic, risk-based pricing can systematically exclude vulnerable consumer groups from essential resources such as health insurance and consumer credit. We show that a regulator can realign private incentives with social objectives through…
Contemporary scientific research is a distributed, collaborative endeavor, carried out by teams of researchers, regulatory institutions, funding agencies, commercial partners, and scientific bodies, all interacting with each other and…
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately observes a set of feasible technologies and can strategically disclose only a subset to the principal. The principal then takes an action whose payoff consequences for both players…
We present our approach to the problem of how an agent, within an economic Multi-Agent System, can determine when it should behave strategically (i.e. learn and use models of other agents), and when it should act as a simple price-taker. We…
An intelligent agent may in general pursue multiple procedural goals simultaneously, which may lead to arise some conflicts (incompatibilities) among them. In this paper, we focus on the incompatibilities that emerge due to resources…
It is challenging to quantify numerical preferences for different objectives in a multi-objective decision-making problem. However, the demonstrations of a user are often accessible. We propose an algorithm to infer linear preference…
We analyse two models of liquidity provision to determine the retail traders' preference for marketable order routing. Order internalization is captured by a model of market makers competing for the retail order flow in a Bertrand fashion.…