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Much work on argument systems has focussed on preferred extensions which define the maximal collectively defensible subsets. Identification and enumeration of these subsets is (under the usual assumptions) computationally demanding. We…
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter reports which of these alternatives they approve. Instead of…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
We study the classical Election problem in anonymous net- works, where solutions can rely on the use of random bits, which may be either shared or unshared among nodes. We provide a complete char- acterization of the conditions under which…
A succesful method to describe the asymptotic behavior of a discrete time stochastic process governed by some recursive formula is to relate it to the limit sets of a well chosen mean differential equation. Under an attainability condition,…
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important…
An election is a pair $(C,V)$ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation) of the candidates. An election is $d$-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates and voters into $\mathbb{R}^d$ such that voter $v$…
Starting with a likelihood or preference order on worlds, we extend it to a likelihood ordering on sets of worlds in a natural way, and examine the resulting logic. Lewis earlier considered such a notion of relative likelihood in the…
Prediction without justification has limited applicability. As a remedy, we learn to extract pieces of input text as justifications -- rationales -- that are tailored to be short and coherent, yet sufficient for making the same prediction.…
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information…
We introduce a statistical physics inspired supervised machine learning algorithm for classification and regression problems. The method is based on the invariances or stability of predicted results when known data is represented as…
Counterfactual utilities evaluate decisions not only by the realized outcome under a given decision, but also by the counterfactual outcomes that would arise under alternative decisions. By generalizing standard utility frameworks, they…
We present a necessary and sufficient condition for Alt's system to be represented by a continuous utility function. Moreover, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for this utility function to be concave. The latter condition can…
This paper is concerned with learning decision makers' preferences using data on observed choices from a finite set of risky alternatives. We propose a discrete choice model with unobserved heterogeneity in consideration sets and in…
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…
Recently several authors have proposed stochastic evolutionary models for the growth of complex networks that give rise to power-law distributions. These models are based on the notion of preferential attachment leading to the ``rich get…
A version of the secretary problem is considered. The ranks of items, whose values are independent, identically distributed random variables $X_1,X_2,...,X_n$ from a uniform distribution on $[0; 1]$, are observed sequentially by the grader.…