Related papers: Small One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profile…
A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has…
A preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan (resp. $d$-Euclidean) if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into the $d$-dimensional space such that between each pair of alternatives, every voter…
We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles,…
Euclidean preferences are a widely studied preference model, in which decision makers and alternatives are embedded in d-dimensional Euclidean space. Decision makers prefer those alternatives closer to them. This model, also known as…
We investigate preference profiles for a set $\mathcal{V}$ of voters, where each voter $i$ has a preference order $\succ_i$ on a finite set $A$ of alternatives (that is, a linear order on $A$) such that for each two alternatives $a,b\in A$,…
We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$ and $\ell_{\infty}$ norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximal size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences)…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
Spatial models of preference, in the form of vector embeddings, are learned by many deep learning and multiagent systems, including recommender systems. Often these models are assumed to approximate a Euclidean structure, where an…
An election is a pair $(C,V)$ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation) of the candidates. An election is $d$-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates and voters into $\mathbb{R}^d$ such that voter $v$…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certain nice structure, as for instance single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted,…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local…
Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental importance in social choice theory. Prior work on this problem has studied the query complexity of preference elicitation for the…
A simple graph G is said to be representable in a real vector space of dimension m if there is an embedding of the vertex set in the vector space such that the Euclidean distance between any two distinct vertices is one of only two distinct…
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…
Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is produced.…
Whether the goal is to analyze voting behavior, locate facilities, or recommend products, the problem of translating between (ordinal) rankings and (numerical) utilities arises naturally in many contexts. This task is commonly approached by…
A unitary (Euclidean) representation of a quiver is given by assigning to each vertex a unitary (Euclidean) vector space and to each arrow a linear mapping of the corresponding vector spaces. We recall an algorithm for reducing the matrices…
We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…