Related papers: On the convergence problem in Mean Field Games: a …
The objective of this work is to study the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria in mean field games involving a major player and a continuum of minor players over finite intervals of arbitrary length. Following earlier…
We consider $N$-player games, in continuous time, finite state space and finite time horizon, on a geometrical structure possessing a macroscopic limit in a suitable sense. This geometrical structure breaks the permutation invariance…
In this paper we establish quantitative convergence results for both open and closed-loop Nash equilibria of N-player stochastic differential games in the setting of Mean Field Games of Controls (MFGC), a class of models where interactions…
In this paper, we consider a first-order deterministic mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which agents moving in a given domain aim to reach a given target set in minimal time. To model interaction between agents, we assume…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population…
In this paper, we consider mean-field games where the interaction of each player with the mean-field takes into account not only the states of the players but also their collective behavior, To do so, we develop a random variable framework…
The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has been…
This paper establishes that a class of $N$-player stochastic games with singular controls, either of bounded velocity or of finite variation, can both be approximated by mean field games (MFGs) with singular controls of bounded velocity.…
We consider mean field game systems in time-horizon $(0,T)$, where the individual cost functional depends locally on the density distribution of the agents, and the Hamiltonian is locally uniformly convex. We show that, even if the coupling…
This paper is devoted to finite horizon deterministic mean field games in which the state space is a network. The agents control their velocity, and when they occupy a vertex, they can enter into any incident edge. The running and terminal…
In this note we prove the uniqueness of solutions to a class of Mean Field Games systems subject to possibly degenerate individual noise. Our results hold true for arbitrary long time horizons and for general non-separable Hamiltonians that…
This paper introduces a notion of weak solution for the coupled system of master equations in mean field games with a major player. It extends the previously introduced notion of Lipschitz solutions in mean field games. By relying on a…
This paper establishes that $N$-player stochastic games with singular controls, either of bounded velocity or of finite variation, can both be approximated by mean field games (MFGs) with singular controls of bounded velocity. More…
In this paper, we consider a class of mean field games in which the optimal strategy of a representative agent depends on the statistical distribution of the states and controls. We prove some existence results for the forward-backward…
We study a particular class of mean field games whose solutions can be formally connected to a scalar transport equation on the Wasserstein space of measures. For this class, we construct some interesting explicit examples of non-uniqueness…
In this paper we study second order master equations arising from mean field games with common noise over arbitrary time duration. A classical solution typically requires the monotonicity condition (or small time duration) and sufficiently…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a stochastic mean-field game of optimal investment. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time horizons, and the mean-field interaction of the representative company…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
This paper revisits the well-studied \emph{optimal stopping} problem but within the \emph{large-population} framework. In particular, two classes of optimal stopping problems are formulated by taking into account the \emph{relative…