Related papers: Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constra…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary feasibility constraints. It is constrained…
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…
We formulate a general class of allocation problems called categorized domain allocation problems (CDAPs), where indivisible items from multiple categories are allocated to agents without monetary transfer and each agent gets at least one…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in assignment mechanisms.…
In the assignment problem, a set of items must be allocated to unit-demand agents who express ordinal preferences (rankings) over the items. In the assignment problem with priorities, agents with higher priority are entitled to their…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of $n$ agents with strict preferences over $n$ houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. For $n \le 3$,…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over $m$ objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the preferences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL…
I provide a unified framework to establish the existence of a weak Pareto efficient, envy-free allocation in general settings: random allocations are probability measures on a compact metric space, and preferences of agents are represented…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…