Related papers: The Partially Observable Games We Play for Cyber D…

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single…

Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking,…

Many real-world decision problems involve the interaction of multiple self-interested agents with limited sensing ability. The partially observable stochastic game (POSG) provides a mathematical framework for modeling these problems,…

Intention deception involves computing a strategy which deceives the opponent into a wrong belief about the agent's intention or objective. This paper studies a class of probabilistic planning problems with intention deception and…

Game-theoretic agents must make plans that optimally gather information about their opponents. These problems are modeled by partially observable stochastic games (POSGs), but planning in fully continuous POSGs is intractable without heavy…

Cyber deception is an emerging proactive defense strategy to counter increasingly sophisticated attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) by misleading and distracting attackers from critical assets. However, since deception…

Cyber deception is one of the key approaches used to mislead attackers by hiding or providing inaccurate system information. There are two main factors limiting the real-world application of existing cyber deception approaches. The first…

Many security and other real-world situations are dynamic in nature and can be modelled as strictly competitive (or zero-sum) dynamic games. In these domains, agents perform actions to affect the environment and receive observations --…

Cyber deception has recently received increasing attentions as a promising mechanism for proactive cyber defense. Cyber deception strategies aim at injecting intentionally falsified information to sabotage the early stage of attack…

Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly…

We introduce deceptive signaling framework as a new defense measure against advanced adversaries in cyber-physical systems. In general, adversaries look for system-related information, e.g., the underlying state of the system, in order to…

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…

We study automated intrusion response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense…

Adversarial decision-making in partially observable multi-agent systems requires sophisticated strategies for both deception and counter-deception. This paper presents a sequential hypothesis testing (SHT)-driven framework that captures the…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…

Modern cyber attacks unfold through multiple stages, requiring defenders to dynamically prioritize mitigations under uncertainty. While game-theoretic models capture attacker-defender interactions, existing approaches often rely on static…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

This paper explores coordinated deception strategies by synchronizing defenses across coupled cyber and physical systems to mislead attackers and strengthen defense mechanisms. We introduce a Stackelberg game framework to model the…

Identifying the actual adversarial threat against a system vulnerability has been a long-standing challenge for cybersecurity research. To determine an optimal strategy for the defender, game-theoretic based decision models have been widely…