Related papers: Equilibria in Quantitative Concurrent Games

This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria…

In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…

Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…

Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are two distinct concepts when dealing with multiple criteria. It is well known that the two concepts do not coincide. However, in this work we show that it is possible to characterize the set of all…

In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

The problem of finding pure strategy Nash equilibria in multiagent concurrent games with finite-horizon temporal goals has received some recent attention. Earlier work solved this problem through the use of Rabin automata. In this work, we…

We consider a game for a continuum of non-identical players evolving on a finite state space. Their heterogeneous interactions are represented by a graphon, which can be viewed as the limit of a dense random graph. The player's transition…

Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific independence between players' utility functions. Actions are represented as nodes in a graph G, and the payoff…

Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…

Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…

We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…

We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…