Related papers: SonarSnoop: Active Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks

We present the first acoustic side-channel attack that recovers what users type on the virtual keyboard of their touch-screen smartphone or tablet. When a user taps the screen with a finger, the tap generates a sound wave that propagates on…

In this paper, we present an acoustic side channel attack which makes use of smartphone microphones recording a robot in operation to exploit acoustic properties of the sound to fingerprint a robot's movements. In this work we consider the…

Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic…

Inaudible voice command injection is one of the most threatening attacks towards voice assistants. Existing attacks aim at injecting the attack signals over the air, but they require the access to the authorized user's voice for activating…

Receiving calls is one of the most universal functions of smartphones, involving sensitive information and critical operations. Unfortunately, to prioritize convenience, the current call receiving process bypasses smartphone authentication…

Voice assistants like Siri enable us to control IoT devices conveniently with voice commands, however, they also provide new attack opportunities for adversaries. Previous papers attack voice assistants with obfuscated voice commands by…

Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…

Voice control is a popular way to operate mobile devices, enabling users to communicate requests to their devices. However, adversaries can leverage voice control to trick mobile devices into executing commands to leak secrets or to modify…

Air-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has been demonstrated as an effective method for exfiltrating data…

Pattern lock has been widely used for authentication to protect user privacy on mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets). Given its pervasive usage, the compromise of pattern lock could lead to serious consequences. Several attacks…

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar…

In this paper, we build a speech privacy attack that exploits speech reverberations generated from a smartphone's in-built loudspeaker captured via a zero-permission motion sensor (accelerometer). We design our attack Spearphone2, and…

Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…

The widespread use of smart devices gives rise to both security and privacy concerns. Fingerprinting smart devices can assist in authenticating physical devices, but it can also jeopardize privacy by allowing remote identification without…

Our research discovers how the rolling shutter and movable lens structures widely found in smartphone cameras modulate structure-borne sounds onto camera images, creating a point-of-view (POV) optical-acoustic side channel for acoustic…

With the increasing popularity of voice-based applications, acoustic eavesdropping has become a serious threat to users' privacy. While on smartphones the access to microphones needs an explicit user permission, acoustic eavesdropping…

Eavesdropping from the user's smartphone is a well-known threat to the user's safety and privacy. Existing studies show that loudspeaker reverberation can inject speech into motion sensor readings, leading to speech eavesdropping. While…

Modern optical mouse sensors, with their advanced precision and high responsiveness, possess an often overlooked vulnerability: they can be exploited for side-channel attacks. This paper introduces Mic-E-Mouse, the first-ever side-channel…

This work explores backdoor attacks for automatic speech recognition systems where we inject inaudible triggers. By doing so, we make the backdoor attack challenging to detect for legitimate users, and thus, potentially more dangerous. We…

Acoustic eavesdropping is a privacy risk, but existing attacks rarely work in real outdoor situations where people make phone calls on the move. We present SuperEar, the first portable system that uses acoustic metamaterials to reliably…