Related papers: Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games: What is …
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…
In a Stackelberg congestion game (SCG), a leader aims to maximize their own gain by anticipating and manipulating the equilibrium state at which the followers settle by playing a congestion game. Often formulated as bilevel programs,…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
We consider the problem of efficiently learning to play single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games when the leader lacks knowledge of the lower-level game. Such games arise in hierarchical decision-making problems involving…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…
Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly strategic games such as zero-sum games and second-price…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…
We study Stackelberg (leader--follower) tuning of network parameters (tolls, capacities, incentives) in combinatorial congestion games, where selfish users choose discrete routes (or other combinatorial strategies) and settle at a…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…