Related papers: Three-dimensional Stable Matching with Cyclic Pref…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line…
We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices $i\in I$ are interpreted as agents, and the edges $c\in C$ as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \subset \mathcal{C}$ of…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
We present a fascinating model that has lately caught attention among physicists working in complexity related fields. Though it originated from mathematics and later from economics, the model is very enlightening in many aspects that we…
Given a set of $n$ men represented by $n$ points lying on a line, and $n$ women represented by $n$ points lying on another parallel line, with each person having a list that ranks some people of opposite gender as his/her acceptable…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We show how fragile stable matchings are in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting. The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics in which randomly-chosen blocking pairs match successively.…
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
This paper analyses the stability of cycles within a heteroclinic network lying in a three-dimensional manifold formed by six cycles, for a one-parameter model developed in the context of game theory. We show the asymptotic stability of the…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972),…
The stable roommates problem with $n$ agents has worst case complexity $O(n^2)$ in time and space. Random instances can be solved faster and with less memory, however. We introduce an algorithm that has average time and space complexity…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
Suppose a committee consisting of three members has to match $n$ candidates to $n$ different positions. Each member of the committee proposes a matching, however the proposed matchings totally disagree, i.e., every candidate is matched to…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
We examine the problem of gathering $k \geq 2$ agents (or multi-agent rendezvous) in dynamic graphs which may change in every synchronous round but remain always connected ($1$-interval connectivity) [KLO10]. The agents are identical and…