Related papers: Three-dimensional Stable Matching with Cyclic Pref…
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…
We study a simple continuous-time multi-agent system related to Krause's model of opinion dynamics: each agent holds a real value, and this value is continuously attracted by every other value differing from it by less than 1, with an…
The leader-following consensus problem for general linear multi-agent systems over jointly connected switching networks has been a challenging problem and the solvability of the problem has been limited to the class of linear multi-agent…
The research paper emphasizes that the Stable Matching problems are the same as the problems of stable configurations of Multi-stage Interconnection Networks (MIN). We have discusses the Stability Problems of Existing Regular Omega…
The well-posedness of the three dimensional Prandtl equation is an outstanding open problem due to the appearance of the secondary flow even though there are studies on analytic and Gevrey function spaces. This problem is raised as the…
In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the resulting matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical and…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…
Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services. Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key design parameter…
Individual preference (IP) stability, introduced by Ahmadi et al. (ICML 2022), is a natural clustering objective inspired by stability and fairness constraints. A clustering is $\alpha$-IP stable if the average distance of every data point…
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not…
We analyze a continuous time multidimensional opinion model where agents have heterogeneous but symmetric and compactly supported interaction functions. We consider Filippov solutions of the resulting dynamics and show strong Lyapunov…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the well-known stable matching problem. Teo and Sethuraman proved that, for each instance of the stable roommates problem in a complete graph, there exists a linear inequality…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
The Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) is a matching problem characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates, where the preferences may have ties or be incomplete. SRTI asks for a…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
This paper studies the distributed mode consensus problem in a multi-agent system, in which the agents each possess a certain attribute and they aim to agree upon the mode (the most frequent attribute owned by the agents) via distributed…
We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…