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Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on.…
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…
Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…
In stochastic Nash equilibrium problems (SNEPs), it is natural for players to be uncertain about their complex environments and have multi-dimensional unknown parameters in their models. Among various SNEPs, this paper focuses on locally…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…
Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…
Motivated by applications to online advertising and recommender systems, we consider a game-theoretic model with delayed rewards and asynchronous, payoff-based feedback. In contrast to previous work on delayed multi-armed bandits, we focus…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…
We present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria in a broad class of constraint satisfaction games that generalize the well-known cut and party affiliation games. Our results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al.~(EC…
We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics where players adjust their strategies based on their actions' cumulative payoffs over time - specifically, by playing mixed strategies that maximize their expected cumulative payoff…
We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…
We examine the long-run behavior of multi-agent online learning in games that evolve over time. Specifically, we focus on a wide class of policies based on mirror descent, and we show that the induced sequence of play (a) converges to Nash…
Zero-sum stochastic games are easy to solve as they can be cast as simple Markov decision processes. This is however not the case with general-sum stochastic games. A fairly general optimization problem formulation is available for…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
We study the performance of the gradient play algorithm for stochastic games (SGs), where each agent tries to maximize its own total discounted reward by making decisions independently based on current state information which is shared…
Min-max saddle point games appear in a wide range of applications in machine leaning and signal processing. Despite their wide applicability, theoretical studies are mostly limited to the special convex-concave structure. While some recent…