Related papers: Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Locatio…
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…
We study the distributed facility location problem, where a set of agents with positions on the line of real numbers are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a point to satisfy certain criteria, such as optimize an…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All…
In the facility location problem, the task is to place one or more facilities so as to minimize the sum of the agent costs for accessing their nearest facility. Heretofore, in the strategic version, agent locations have been assumed to be…
We analyze, both analytically and numerically, the self-organization of a system of "selfish" adaptive agents playing an arbitrary iterated pairwise game (defined by a 2X2 payoff matrix). Examples of possible games to play are: the…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…
In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate distance measure from the agents to the facility.…
This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical autonomous decision-making framework to address a task allocation problem for a swarm of multiple agents. We consider cooperation of self-interested agents, and show that our proposed…
We consider $k$-Facility Location games, where $n$ strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to $k\ge 2$ facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize her distance to the nearest facility. We are…
Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediates economic transactions between buyers and sellers.…
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…
The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool-punishers as the three competing…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…