Related papers: Equilibrium and Learning in Queues with Advance Re…
In lowest unique bid auctions, $N$ players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the \emph{lowest} bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium…
We model a delivery platform facilitating transactions among three sides: buyers, stores, and couriers. In addition to buyers paying store-specific purchase prices and couriers receiving store--buyer-specific delivery compensation from the…
The framework of uncoupled online learning in multiplayer games has made significant progress in recent years. In particular, the development of time-varying games has considerably expanded its modeling capabilities. However, current regret…
This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…
We study equilibrium investment into bidding and latency reduction for different sequencing policies. For a batch auction design, we observe that bidders shade bids according to the likelihood that competing bidders land in the current…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
In a two node tandem network, customers decide to join or balk by maximizing a given profit function whose costs are proportional to the sojourn time they spend at each queue. Assuming that their choices are taken without knowing the…
The equilibrium properties of allocation algorithms for networks with a large number of nodes with finite capacity are investigated. Every node is receiving a flow of requests and when a request arrives at a saturated node, i.e. a node…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…
In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…
When customers must visit a seller to learn the valuation of its product, sellers potentially benefit from charging a lower price on the first visit and a higher price when a buyer returns. Armstrong and Zhou (2016) show that such price…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such…
In most service systems, the servers are humans who desire to experience a certain level of idleness. In call centers, this manifests itself as the call avoidance behavior, where servers strategically adjust their service rate to strike a…
We study equilibria in an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging game, a cost minimization game inherent to decentralized charging control strategy for EV power demand management. In our model, each user optimizes its total cost which is sum of…
In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which…
We study online task allocation for multi-robot, multi-queue systems with asymmetric stochastic arrivals and switching delays. We formulate the problem in discrete time: each location can host at most one robot per slot, servicing a task…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
In this paper, we study scheduling of a queueing system with zero knowledge of instantaneous network conditions. We consider a one-hop single-server queueing system consisting of $K$ queues, each with time-varying and non-stationary arrival…
This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…