Related papers: Equilibrium and Learning in Queues with Advance Re…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
Motivated by the increasing use of online appointment booking platforms, we study how to offer appointment slots to customers in order to maximize the total number of slots booked. We develop two models, non-sequential offering and…
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural no-overbidding assumption: the buyers do not bid above their…
We study a two-sided market, wherein, price-sensitive heterogeneous customers and servers arrive and join their respective queues. A compatible customer-server pair can then be matched by the platform, at which point, they leave the system.…
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…
Multi-server queueing systems describe situations in which users require service from multiple parallel servers. Examples include check-in lines at airports, waiting rooms in hospitals, queues in contact centers, data buffers in wireless…
Learning in games has been widely used to solve many cooperative multi-agent problems such as coverage control, consensus, self-reconfiguration or vehicle-target assignment. One standard approach in this domain is to formulate the problem…
In this paper, we study an optimal online resource reservation problem in a simple communication network. The network is composed of two compute nodes linked by a local communication link. The system operates in discrete time; at each time…
We establish Nash equilibrium learning in large populations of noncooperative, strategic agents. Our analysis considers the broadest class to date of payoff mechanisms with first-order modifications, capable of modeling bounded rationality…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We…
We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…
We consider a setting where $n$ buyers, with combinatorial preferences over $m$ items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited information about the results of these…
We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…
The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest server. In this…
We study a dynamic pricing and capacity sizing problem in a $GI/GI/1$ queue, where the service provider's objective is to obtain the optimal service fee $p$ and service capacity $\mu$ so as to maximize the cumulative expected profit (the…
We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that…
This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent…