Related papers: Convergence to the Mean Field Game Limit: A Case S…
We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…
We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…
We consider zero-sum repeated games in which the players are restricted to strategies that require only a limited amount of randomness. Let $v_n$ be the max-min value of the $n$ stage game; previous works have characterized…
We consider a game for a continuum of non-identical players evolving on a finite state space. Their heterogeneous interactions are represented by a graphon, which can be viewed as the limit of a dense random graph. The player's transition…
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally,…
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…
This paper considers decentralized control and optimization methodologies for large populations of systems, consisting of several agents with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests, and affected by the aggregate behavior…
The number of Nash equilibria of the mixed extension of a generic finite game in normal form is finite and odd. This raises the question how large the number can be, depending on the number of players and the numbers of their pure…
This work introduces a new general approach for the numerical analysis of stable equilibria to second order mean field games systems in cases where the uniqueness of solutions may fail. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a simple…
Mean field games (MFGs) describe the limit, as $n$ tends to infinity, of stochastic differential games with $n$ players interacting with one another through their common empirical distribution. Under suitable smoothness assumptions that…
This paper revisits the well-studied \emph{optimal stopping} problem but within the \emph{large-population} framework. In particular, two classes of optimal stopping problems are formulated by taking into account the \emph{relative…
We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position…
In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…
In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations using a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type stemming from…
We investigate the convergence of symmetric stochastic differential games with interactions via control, where the volatility terms of both idiosyncratic and common noises are controlled. We apply the stochastic maximum principle, following…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
We consider a general class of finite-player stochastic games with mean-field interaction, in which the linear-quadratic cost functional includes linear operators acting on controls in $L^2$. We propose a novel approach for deriving the…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…