Related papers: Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the…
One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner,…
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…
Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios…
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes" condition. The goal of this paper is to evaluate…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for a better deal. They help overcome the low-revenue issues of…
We develop conditions under which individual choices and Walrasian equilibrium prices and allocations can be exactly inferred from finite market data. First, we consider market data that consist of individual demands as prices and incomes…
We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…
While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
Buyers (e.g., advertisers) often have limited financial and processing resources, and so their participation in auctions is throttled. Changes to auctions may affect bids or throttling and any change may affect what winners pay. This paper…
We show that a competitive equilibrium always exists in combinatorial auctions with anonymous graphical valuations and pricing, using discrete geometry. This is an intuitive and easy-to-construct class of valuations that can model both…
In cloud investment markets, consumers are looking for the lowest cost and a desirable fairness while providers are looking for strategies to achieve the highest possible profit and return. Most existing models for auction-based resource…
Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) allow bidders to express complex preferences for bundles of goods being auctioned. However, the behavior of bidders under different payment rules is often unclear. In this paper, we aim to understand how core…
In quasi-proportional auctions, the allocation is shared among bidders in proportion to their weighted bids. The auctioneer selects a bid weight function, and bidders know the weight function when they bid. In this note, we analyze how…
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total…