Exponential Weight Functions for Quasi-Proportional Auctions
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-09-07 v1
Abstract
In quasi-proportional auctions, the allocation is shared among bidders in proportion to their weighted bids. The auctioneer selects a bid weight function, and bidders know the weight function when they bid. In this note, we analyze how weight functions that are exponential in the bid affect bidder behavior. We show that exponential weight functions have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we characterize bids at an equilibrium, and we compare it to an equilibrium for power weight functions.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1509.01314,
title = {Exponential Weight Functions for Quasi-Proportional Auctions},
author = {Eric Bax and James Li and Zheng Wen},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.01314},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
16 pages, 16 figures