Related papers: Selfishness need not be bad: a general proof

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…

We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…

Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system…

This paper investigates equilibrium computation and the price of anarchy for Bayesian games, which are the fundamental models of games with incomplete information. In normal-form games with complete information, it is known that efficiently…

This paper provides a comprehensive convergence analysis of the PoA of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands.

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…

We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are distributed independently. We show that if their full…

Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the…

We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumption that the $k-1$ subsequent players play subgame-perfectly.…

Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on "no-regret" algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics…

We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…

In this work we study the power and limitations of fair interventions in weighted congestion games. Specifically, we focus on interventions that aim at improving the equilibrium quality (price of anarchy) and are fair in a suitably defined…

This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination…

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

A key challenge in responding to public health crises such as COVID-19 is the difficulty of predicting the results of feedback interconnections between the disease and society. As a step towards understanding these interconnections, we pose…

Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in…

We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in…

In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…