Related papers: Choice revision on belief bases
Background: Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or evaluate new information in a way that is consistent with one's preexisting beliefs. It is omnipresent in psychology, economics, and even scientific practices. Prior theoretical…
Natural revision seems so natural: it changes beliefs as little as possible to incorporate new information. Yet, some counterexamples show it wrong. It is so conservative that it never fully believes. It only believes in the current…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we…
The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal…
Rational belief revision is commonly viewed as being based on a preference order between possible worlds, with the resulting new belief set being those sentences true in all the most preferred models of the incoming new information.…
When engaging in argumentative discourse, skilled human debaters tailor claims to the beliefs of the audience, to construct effective arguments. Recently, the field of computational argumentation witnessed extensive effort to address the…
We study how to infer new choices from prior choices using the framework of choice functions, a unifying mathematical framework for decision-making based on sets of preference orders. In particular, we define the natural (most conservative)…
The human mind is capable of extraordinary achievements, yet it often appears to work against itself. It actively defends its cherished beliefs even in the face of contradictory evidence, conveniently interprets information to conform to…
The introduction of explicit notions of rejection, or disbelief, into logics for knowledge representation can be justified in a number of ways. Motivations range from the need for versions of negation weaker than classical negation, to the…
We construct a probabilistic coherence measure for information sets which determines a partial coherence ordering. This measure is applied in constructing a criterion for expanding our beliefs in the face of new information. A number of…
The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably)…
Several forms of iterable belief change exist, differing in the kind of change and its strength: some operators introduce formulae, others remove them; some add formulae unconditionally, others only as additions to the previous beliefs;…
In this paper we explore a class of belief update operators, in which the definition of the operator is compositional with respect to the sentence to be added. The goal is to provide an update operator that is intuitive, in that its…
Iterated belief revision requires information about the current beliefs. This information is represented by mathematical structures called doxastic states. Most literature concentrates on how to revise a doxastic state and neglects that it…
In the classic AGM belief revision theory, beliefs are static and do not change their own shape. For instance, if p is accepted by a rational agent, it will remain p to the agent. But such rarely happens to us. Often, when we accept some…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Roughly, revision treats a surprising observation…
Probabilistic epistemic argumentation allows for reasoning about argumentation problems in a way that is well founded by probability theory. Epistemic states are represented by probability functions over possible worlds and can be adjusted…
AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated…
We present here a formal foundation for an iterative and incremental approach to constructing and evaluating preference queries. Our main focus is on query modification: a query transformation approach which works by revising the preference…
Within the formal setting of the Lockean thesis, an agent belief set is defined in terms of degrees of confidence and these are described in probabilistic terms. This approach is of established interest, notwithstanding some limitations…