Related papers: Choice revision on belief bases
We look at preference change arising out of an interaction between two elements: the first is an initial preference ranking encoding a pre-existing attitude; the second element is new preference information signaling input from an…
The research on non-prioritized revision studies revision operators which do not accept all new beliefs. In this paper, we contribute to this line of research by introducing the concept of dynamic-limited revision, which are revisions…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
Belief revision is the process in which an agent incorporates a new piece of information together with a pre-existing set of beliefs. When the new information comes in the form of a report from another agent, then it is clear that we must…
In this paper we formalise three types of cognitive bias within the framework of belief revision: confirmation bias, framing bias, and anchoring bias. We interpret them generally, as restrictions on the process of iterated revision, and we…
The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and…
In this paper we introduce a nonmonotonic framework for belief revision in which reasoning about the reliability of different pieces of information based on meta-knowledge about the information is possible, and where revision strategies can…
The belief revision literature has largely focussed on the issue of how to revise one's beliefs in the light of information regarding matters of fact. Here we turn to an important but comparatively neglected issue: How might one extend a…
I propose a framework for an agent to change its probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information $\alpha$ is observed. Traditionally, belief change occurs by either a revision process or by an update process, depending…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper, we introduce a new framework…
We consider the two-fold problem of representing collective beliefs and aggregating these beliefs. We propose modular, transitive relations for collective beliefs. They allow us to represent conflicting opinions and they have a clear…
Subset models provide a new semantics for justifcation logic. The main idea of subset models is that evidence terms are interpreted as sets of possible worlds. A term then justifies a formula if that formula is true in each world of the…
We address a general representation problem for belief change, and describe two interrelated representations for iterative non-prioritized change: a logical representation in terms of persistent epistemic states, and a constructive…
We study belief revision when information is represented by a set of probability distributions, or general information. General information extends the standard event notion while including qualitative information (A is more likely than B),…
We are interested in belief revision involving conditional statements where the antecedent is almost certainly false. To represent such problems, we use Ordinal Conditional Functions that may take infinite values. We model belief change in…
In a probability-based reasoning system, Bayes' theorem and its variations are often used to revise the system's beliefs. However, if the explicit conditions and the implicit conditions of probability assignments `me properly distinguished,…
In the field of knowledge representation, the considered epistemic states are often based on propositional interpretations, also called worlds. E.g., epistemic states of agents can be modelled by ranking functions or total preorders on…
The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties.…
A common assumption in belief revision is that the reliability of the information sources is either given, derived from temporal information, or the same for all. This article does not describe a new semantics for integration but the…
This paper extends the applications of belief-networks to include the revision of belief commitments, i.e., the categorical acceptance of a subset of hypotheses which, together, constitute the most satisfactory explanation of the evidence…