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The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
In load balancing problems there is a set of clients, each wishing to select a resource from a set of permissible ones, in order to execute a certain task. Each resource has a latency function, which depends on its workload, and a client's…
We consider the platoon matching problem for a set of trucks with the same origin, but different destinations. It is assumed that the vehicles benefit from traveling in a platoon for instance through reduced fuel consumption. The vehicles…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
This paper considers the competitive resource allocation problem in Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) interfering channels, when users maximize their energy efficiency. Considering each transmitter-receiver pair as a selfish player,…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…
We analyze an infinite-horizon deterministic joint replenishment model from a non-cooperative game-theoretical approach. In this model, a group of retailers can choose to jointly place an order, which incurs a major setup cost independent…
We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the…
The multi-cluster games are addressed in this paper, where all players team up with the players in the cluster that they belong to, and compete against the players in other clusters to minimize the cost function of their own cluster. The…
When two players are engaged in a repeated game with unknown payoff matrices, they may use single-agent multi-armed bandit algorithms to choose the actions independent of each other. We show that when the players use Thompson sampling, the…
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…
In business, politics and life, folk wisdom encourages people to aim for above-average results, but to not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Here, we mathematically formalize and extend this folk wisdom. We model a time-limited…
We introduce the Funding Game, in which $m$ identical resources are to be allocated among $n$ selfish agents. Each agent requests a number of resources $x_i$ and reports a valuation $\tilde{v}_i(x_i)$, which verifiably {\em lower}-bounds…
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell secondary access to its channel at multiple locations. Transmission qualities of a channel evolve randomly. Each primary needs to select a price and a set of…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
We study one-shot Nash competition between an arbitrary number of identical dealers that compete for the order flow of a client. The client trades either because of proprietary information, exposure to idiosyncratic risk, or a mix of both…
We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms using an explore-then-exploit pipeline: they randomize prices during an initial exploration phase,…
We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of…