Related papers: How good are Popular Matchings?
Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), an extension of the well-known Stable Marriage and Hospital Residents problem. In this model, students have preferences over projects, each…
Reciprocal recommender systems (RRSs) are crucial in online two-sided matching platforms, such as online job or dating markets, as they need to consider the preferences of both sides of the match. The concentration of recommendations to a…
In this paper we address the problem of joint admission control and resource scheduling for \emph{Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications} (URLLC). We examine two models: (i) the \emph{continuous}, where all allocated resource blocks…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
Consistent hashing is fundamental to distributed systems, but ring-based schemes can exhibit high peak-to-average load ratios unless they use many virtual nodes, while multi-probe methods improve balance at the cost of scattered memory…
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm allows one to sample asymptotically from any probability distribution $\pi$. There has been recently much work devoted to the development of variants of the MH update which can handle scenarios where such…
We study a natural generalization of the maximum weight many-to-one matching problem. We are given an undirected bipartite graph $G= (A \cup P, E)$ with weights on the edges in $E$, and with lower and upper quotas on the vertices in $P$. We…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as…
Range Minimum Query (RMQ) is an important building brick of many compressed data structures and string matching algorithms. Although this problem is essentially solved in theory, with sophisticated data structures allowing for constant time…
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side corresponds to applicants who have preferences and the other side to houses who do not have preferences. We consider two different types of this market: one, where the applicants…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
Motivated by applications in the gig economy, we study approximation algorithms for a \emph{sequential pricing problem}. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(I,J,E)$ between individuals $I$ and jobs $J$. The platform has a value of $v_j$ for…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…