Related papers: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching …
Job-scheduling games have traditionally assumed fixed processing times. However, in many realistic environments, ranging from cyber-security response to high-frequency trading, a task's duration depends on its starting time. We study…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
We propose a new all-pay auction format in which risk-loving bidders pay a constant fee each time they bid for an object whose monetary value is common knowledge among the bidders, and bidding fees are the only source of benefit for the…
The game of best choice (or "secretary problem") is a model for making an irrevocable decision among a fixed number of candidate choices that are presented sequentially in random order, one at a time. Because the classically optimal…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
We study dynamic relationships in which one party extracts current surplus in ways that degrade the future state, while the counterparty cannot exit but adjusts effort in response. Standard stationary Markov equilibria may sustain collapse…
We propose a new sequential Efficient Pseudo-Likelihood (k-EPL) estimator for dynamic discrete choice games of incomplete information. k-EPL considers the joint behavior of multiple players simultaneously, as opposed to individual responses…
This paper provides a general characterization of subgame perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investment. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market…
Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game…
We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
We present a novel, game theoretic representation of a multi-agent prediction market using a partially observable stochastic game with information (POSGI). We then describe a correlated equilibrium (CE)-based solution strategy for this game…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements.…
We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
Due to the large size of the training data, distributed learning approaches such as federated learning have gained attention recently. However, the convergence rate of distributed learning suffers from heterogeneous worker performance. In…
We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting,…