Related papers: Decentralized Combinatorial Auctions for Multi-Uni…
This article presents an architecture for multi-agent task allocation and task execution, through the unification of a market-inspired task-auctioning system with Behavior Trees for managing and executing lower level behaviors. We consider…
In traditional machine learning, the central server first collects the data owners' private data together and then trains the model. However, people's concerns about data privacy protection are dramatically increasing. The emerging paradigm…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
We consider an extension of the rollout algorithm that applies to constrained deterministic dynamic programming, including challenging combinatorial optimization problems. The algorithm relies on a suboptimal policy, called base heuristic.…
Federated learning makes it possible for all parties with data isolation to train the model collaboratively and efficiently while satisfying privacy protection. To obtain a high-quality model, an incentive mechanism is necessary to motivate…
Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the…
Auctions have been employed as an effective framework for the management and the assignment of tasks in mobile crowdsensing (MCS). In auctions terminology, the clearance rate (CR) refers to the percentage of items that are sold over the…
With the emerging technologies of Internet of Things (IOTs), the capabilities of mobile devices have increased tremendously. However, in the big data era, to complete tasks on one device is still challenging. As an emerging technology,…
The E-commerce advertising platforms typically sell commercial traffic through either second-price auction (SPA) or first-price auction (FPA). SPA was historically prevalent due to its dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) for…
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial…
We propose a novel formulation of the collision-aware task assignment (CATA) problem and a decentralized auction-based algorithm to solve the problem with optimality bound. Using a collision cone, we predict potential collisions and…
Cloud auctions provide cost-effective strategies for cloud VM allocation. Most existing cloud auctions simply assume that the auctioneer is trustable, and thus the fairness of auctions can be easily achieved. However, in fact, such a…
This paper investigates the integration of large language models (LLMs) as reasoning agents in repeated spectrum auctions within heterogeneous networks (HetNets). While auction-based mechanisms have been widely employed for efficient…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…
We study the problem of data selling for Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) tasks in Generative AI applications. We model each buyer's valuation of a dataset with a natural coverage-based valuation function that increases with the…
With the recent growth in the size of cloud computing business, handling the interactions between customers and cloud providers has become more challenging. Auction theory has been proposed to model these interactions due to its simplicity…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
Allocating tasks to heterogeneous robot teams in environments with uncertain task requirements is a fundamentally challenging problem. Redundantly assigning multiple robots to such tasks is overly conservative, while purely reactive…