Related papers: Decentralized Combinatorial Auctions for Multi-Uni…
Federated learning (FL) is a prospective distributed machine learning framework that can preserve data privacy. In particular, cross-silo FL can complete model training by making isolated data islands of different organizations collaborate…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payment may or may not happen, and its probability is called the…
We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items.…
Auction-based recommender systems are prevalent in online advertising platforms, but they are typically optimized to allocate recommendation slots based on immediate expected return metrics, neglecting the downstream effects of…
This paper considers an electric vehicle charging scheduling setting where vehicle users can reserve charging time in advance at a charging station. In this setting, users are allowed to explicitly express their preferences over different…
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $i$ has a private value $v_i$, a budget $b_i$, and is interested in all the items in $S_i$. The value to agent $i$ of a set of items $R$ is $|R \cap S_i| \cdot v_i$. Such…
The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primary mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is known to output a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes…
We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…
This article introduces a generalized framework for Decentralized Learning formulated as a Multi-Objective Optimization problem, in which both distributed agents and a central coordinator contribute independent, potentially conflicting…
The multiple knapsack problem with grouped items aims to maximize rewards by assigning groups of items among multiple knapsacks, considering knapsack capacities. Either all items in a group are assigned or none at all. We propose algorithms…
We consider a resource allocation problem over an undirected network of agents, where edges of the network define communication links. The goal is to minimize the sum of agent-specific convex objective functions, while the agents' decisions…
We consider the problem of finding a low-cost allocation and ordering of tasks between a team of robots in a d-dimensional, uncertain, landscape, and the sensitivity of this solution to changes in the cost function. Various algorithms have…
Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed…
We study revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, where bidders have subadditive valuations over independent items. Providing a simple mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal in this setting is a major open problem in mechanism…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but more than 40 years later a full analytical understanding of…
A novel distributed energy allocation mechanism for Distribution System Operator (DSO) market through a bi-level iterative auction is proposed. With the locational marginal price at the substation node known, the DSO runs an upper level…
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…