Related papers: The incentive (in)compatibility of group-based qua…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
Knockout tournaments constitute a popular format for organizing sports competitions. While prior results have shown that it is often possible to manipulate a knockout tournament by fixing the bracket, these results ignore the prevalent…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons is widely encountered in sociology, politics, economics, psychology, sports, etc . Given the enormous social impact and the consequent incentives, the potential adversary has a strong motivation to…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
As AI regulations around the world intensify their focus on system safety, contestability has become a mandatory, yet ill-defined, safeguard. In XAI, "contestability" remains an empty promise: no formal definition exists, no algorithm…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
Round robin tournaments are omnipresent in sport competitions and beyond. We propose two new integer programming formulations for scheduling a round robin tournament, one of which we call the matching formulation. We analytically compare…
Admissibility has been studied for games of infinite duration with Boolean objectives. We extend here this study to games of infinite duration with quantitative objectives. First, we show that, un- der the assumption that optimal worst-case…
Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, for practical reasons, the number of comparable coalitions is…
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions…
Tournament-based compensation schemes with forced distributions represent a widely adopted class of relative performance evaluation mechanisms in technology and corporate environments. These systems mandate within-team ranking and fixed…
During the last twenty years, a lot of research was conducted on the sport elimination problem: Given a sports league and its remaining matches, we have to decide whether a given team can still possibly win the competition, i.e., place…
We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to…
We consider large scale cost allocation problems and consensus seeking problems for multiple agents, in which agents are suggested to collaborate in a distributed algorithm to find a solution. If agents are strategic to minimize their own…
The lack of cooperation can easily result in inequality among members of a society, which provides an increasing gap between individual incomes. To tackle this issue, we introduce an incentive mechanism based on individual strategies and…
Imitation sometimes achieves success in multi-agent situations even though it is very simple. In game theory, success of imitation has been characterized by unbeatability against other agents. Previous studies specified conditions under…
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a symmetric Bayes--Nash equilibrium for contests that have two…